Event: NSA Representative to the FBI
Type of Event: Interview
Date: January 9, 2004
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Lorry Fenner
Team Number: 2  Location: K Street
Participants – non-Commission: NSA or FBI GC representative.
Participants – Commission: Lorry Fenner plus one
(U) Mr. was in the Army Security Agency (Intelligence/SIGINT) and then with the Defense Language Agency. He spoke Arabic and ended up going to the American University in Cairo for Graduate School. In the became an NSA linguist and analyst on the Middle East. He eventually became a supervisor and then branch chief. In 1995 he became the Senior Intelligence Officer (SINIO) for CT (this was a new position so there was only one before him) so he led NSA's CT intelligence production and was NSA's representative to the CTC. He coordinated for NSA on the NIEs and worked with the Interagency Intelligence Counterterrorism Committee (IICT).
9/11 Classified Information
In 1997 he went to the National Security Division of the FBI to work CT and CI. And in 1999 he became the senior NSA representative to the FBI.
(U) worked with the FBI when being an integree was not considered a good thing and if you stayed too long you "became one of them." He was charged "with doing everything," including draft requests for information (RFI) for the FBI to send to NSA. He worked through the Office of Liaison and NSA Customer Relations (S112). He said when Gen. Hayden arrived as Director of NSA, he took a much more hands on approach. He said that the FBI and NSA had a memorandum of understanding that set broad guidelines, but his activities there were rather ad hoc. As the senior NSA representative at FBI, worked on counterterrorism and counterintelligence.
They had routine counterpart meetings, so he
met regularly with who was the FBI's representative at the NSA.
from the FBI was also assigned to the NSA with a couple other people.

NSA and FBI worked together on  9/11 Classified Inform  Sending a representative to the attempt. There they focused on CT and issues.	
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Since 9/11, he gets to see the Director's	
as well as targeting information. He pointed out though that the content	
since there are so many more people with access now. FBI has reenergiz	
feedback mechanisms on NSA collection to improve NSA services and p	
institutionalizing the new procedures. Unfortunately there has been a high at FBI. Since they have a case rather than a target orientation, agents need	
training." Currently the SIOC at FBI tracks the RFIs by number – the CI	
gives them context and makes sure they get to the right NSA office with	
priority of the requests and he helps on questions concerning "US person	
help with setting requirements, there is a separate FBI office for that. He	
in-service training. If issues are real-time they go right to the National So	
Operations Center (NSOC 24/7) at NSA from the CIN desk. NSA does s	
reporting.	
However, SCI level material for FBI. There is a 501	
they track accountability. The Administration section receives electronic	
them in special files they hand carry as snail mail. They work from lists	
personnel" to deliver these hard copies of e-messages. FBI IT systems are	
they are at the SECRET level. They do not have an SCI LAN yet. Analy	
information, but they do not have accounts that SCI information can be p NSA subject line in a message defines the distribution at the FBI. The N	
	ess to NSAnet,
JWICS, SIPRNET and IC reporting through the ANCHORY system. His	
with CIA is through CTC (ITOS 1 and 2 and, TFOS?). The FBI still look	
broker intelligence support on behalf of the entire intelligence community	
how important SIGINT is to them.	,,,
In the SIOC there are 2 terminals manned by an NSA person on days	, but can be
manned with 24 hour coverage when necessary. The duty agent priori to	
the terminals. The CT watch did not have intellink either. If FBI was lef	
for reports, they could pull reports by topics as a stop gap. "Tearlines" ac	
retyped to be resent, rather than manipulated on line or just forwarded. The	
Even hardcopy had to be retyped. IBM is n	
working at the FBI to try to help modernize their system. FBI was not SC	` •
Compartmented Information Facility) so they can't transmit and retain SC have STU phones. There are a few areas that are SCIF'd now, like Maure	
(intelligence chief) office. Fixing this is in the Strategic Plan. TRRS is the	
AMHS (?).	
,	
(U) The fusion issue is a legal one that revolved around "the wall". They	y don't want
NSA material in discovery or NSA people on the stand in open court. Set	•

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	decision makers made tradeoffs on this. For FISA they always asked first and had to go
	through Judge Lamberth. Before 9/11 even during the Millennium, sharing was strictly limited as to what they could see.
	There are no
	problems with "need to know" so it's not relevant to change that. They use their best judgment to share.
	Judgment to share.
	(U) Mr said that Gen Hayden met separately with the Director of the Bureau
	to discuss "DCI level stuff". was not involved in any Hayden - Louis Freeh meetings. The NSA representatives did go to the Assistant Director level meetings and
	these involved "two-way" conversations. There was also an executive series for reports.
	On the KL incident there were section chiefs who sat down with CIA, FBI and NSA
	information briefings (not before the KL meeting but after). The NSA representative could bring even more information to those meetings. His job was to know what was
	important to the Assistant Director (anticipating his needs) and how NSA could help him.
	The NSA representative would have to establish new relationships if there is a new MI-5.
	There are NSA people at DHS and at CIA  The travel to Malaysia would not have been briefed at the Assistant Director level. NSA
	did issue a travel report on Khalid from Yemen and possible involvement in the East
	Africa bombings. 9/11 Classified Information
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(U) After Governor Kean's statement in December 2003 that "9/11 could've been
prevented if they had connected the dots", Mr thought "here they go again".
He believes there's lots of blame to go around, not just against the FBI. They did some
after-actions at FBI after the Millennium on positive lessons. was there
before in the summer of 2001). He believes that budget and personnel cuts had a
large effect. Admiral McConnell said CIA was trying to "more with less" but he told
NSA, we can only do "less with less."
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9/11 Closed by Statute